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A Primer on Child Abuse and Neglect Law
By Sarah H. Ramsey and Douglas E. Abrams

ABSTRACT
This article surveys major aspects of child abuse and neglect law encountered by
judges, lawyers, child advocates, and child care professionals. The authors, whose
casebook, Children and the Law: Doctrine, Policy andPractice(West 4th ed. forthcoming
2010), is required reading in nearly seventy law schools, analyze both statutory and
case law.

INTRODUCTION
Constitutional and Statutory Framework
Abuse and neglect laws rest on a delicate balance grounded in constitutional
guarantees. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has articulated a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to family integrity, which includes the right of
parents to raise their children as they see fit without unreasonable state interference.' The

1 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion) (calling the parental interest
recognized in Meyer and Pierce "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by" the
Court).

Sarah H. Ramsey, J.D., LL.M., is a Professor of Law at Syracuse University College of Law. She
directs the law school's Family Law and Social Policy Center and is a member of the New York State Bar
Association's Children and the Law Committee.
Douglas E. Abrams, J.D., is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Missouri, Columbia,
where he teaches children and the law, family law, constitutional law, and American legal history. He has
served as Associate Editor of juvenile and Family Court journal since 1993. Correspondence: abramsd@
missouri.edu
Editor's Note: This article is adapted from Chapter 3 of Children and the Law in a Nutshell, by Sarah
H. Ramsey and Douglas E. Abrams (3d ed. 2008), published by West (To order, call 800-328-9352, or visit
http://west.thomson.com). Reprinted by permission.
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Court has also applied privacy doctrines to sustain the integrity of family decisionmaking.2
Parents and other caregivers sometimes invoke these constitutional rights in an
effort to thwart state intervention for "child maltreatment," a term that child advocates
and other experts frequently use to encompass abuse and neglect.' Parental prerogatives,
however, do not hold boundless constitutional protection. In 1944, in Prince v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court specified that "[aicting to guard the general interest in
youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control," and that
"the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things
affecting the child's welfare."
The Supreme Court has balanced constitutional imperatives and parental rights in
numerous decisions after Prince. In 1972, for example, Stanley v. Illinois recognized not
only "the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody and management of his
or her children,"' but also "[tihe state's right-indeed, duty-to protect minor children
through a judicial determination of their interests in a neglect proceeding."6
Where the court finds maltreatment, the state's parens patriae authority to protect
the child clearly prevails over any constitutional interest asserted by the parents. The
parents' Fourteenth Amendment interest is "limited ... by the compelling governmental interest in protecting minor children, particularly in circumstances where the protection is considered necessary as against the parents themselves."' Reasonably
anticipated harm, as well as actual harm, can be a basis for state intervention, because the
state does not have to wait until the child is actually injured before removing the child
from the parents' custody, temporarily or permanently.'
The propriety of official intervention may require fine line-drawing. At one end of
the spectrum, intervention and removal seem clearly appropriate when a parent has
severely beaten or maimed a child. At the other end, however, authorities have sometimes
sought to remove children from their parents on little more than a conclusion that the
parents follow an immoral lifestyle or have insufficient income to provide a "proper"
home. Beyond constitutional and statutory doctrine, the decision whether to remove the
child is made yet more difficult because removed children too often receive inadequate
state-provided care. They may be placed in long-term foster care, for example, with
multiple placements and minimal services that together compromise physical or emotional support throughout childhood and adolescence. 9

2 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3 See, e.g., VINCENT J. FONTANA & DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, THE MALTREATED CHILD: THE
MALTREATMENT SYNDROME IN CHILDREN: A MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIAL GUIDE (5th ed. 1996).

4 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944).
5 405 U.S. at 651.
6 Id. at 649.
7 Scharz Family v. Gierer, 399 F. Supp.2d 973, 988 (E.D. Mo. 2004).
8 See, e.g., B.T.O. v. M.O., 91 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Mo. Cc. App. 2002).
9 See generally SARAH H. RAMSEY & DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, CHILDREN
NUTSHELL, ch.4 (3d ed. 2008).
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The Child Protection System
Three major systems regulate households beset with maltreatment. The first system
is the criminal law system, which may prosecute parents and other caregivers who inflict
maltreatment. The second is the public welfare system, which may provide financial
supports. The third is the civil child protection system, this article's focus. Juvenile court
or family court proceedings alleging abuse or neglect are civil proceedings, though
alleged perpetrators may also face criminal prosecution in the general jurisdiction court.
Once the juvenile court system began in 1899, child protection cases became a
major part of the caseload.'o In the early 1960s, maltreatment attracted the attention of
the media, the public, the medical profession, and lawmakers because of reports on the
"battered child syndrome."" Responding to widespread public concern, states enacted
laws that required physicians to report suspected child abuse to state authorities. In 1974,
Congress enacted the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), which
provided funding for state child abuse and neglect programs, established standards for
child abuse and neglect reporting and investigation, required appointment of guardians
ad litem for children in abuse and neglect cases, and established the National Center on
Child Abuse and Neglect.' 2
In 1990, the U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect called maltreatment
a "national emergency" while reported incidents continued to increase, partly because of
parents' drug use, the stresses of poverty, and improved reporting." In 2007, child
protection agencies received an estimated 3.2 million referrals concerning approximately
5.8 million children. Approximately 62% of these reports were investigated, with 61.3%
of the investigations finding that the maltreatment was not substantiated. An estimated
794,000 children were determined to be maltreated. Fifty-nine percent of the maltreated
children were neglected; 10.8% were physically abused; 7.6% were sexually abused; and
4.2% were emotionally maltreated. An estimated 1,760 children died from maltreatment. Parents were the perpetrators in 79.9% of the cases."
Child maltreatment occurs at all socioeconomic levels and in all racial and ethnic
groups. The child protection caseload, however, has a disproportionately large representation of low-income families and minority families (although a majority of victims are
white). Observers disagree about whether this disproportionate representation is due to
a greater incidence of maltreatment in these families, or whether these families are more
likely to face intrusive interventions that are culturally, racially, and class biased."
Observers also disagree about the causes of child maltreatment, but most theories
"recognize that the root causes can be organized into a framework of four principal

10 See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, A VERY SPECIAL PLACE IN LIFE: THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE
MISSOURI 50-52 (2003).
11 C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered Child Syndrome, 191 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 17 (1962).
12 Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4; Pub. L. No. 104-235, 110 Stat. 3063.
13 U.S. ADVISORY BOARD ON CHILD ABuSE AND NEGLECT, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CRITI-

JUSTICE IN

CAL FIRST STEPS IN RESPONSE TO A NATIONAL EMERGENCY (1990).

14 U.S.
15 U.S.

DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT
ADVISORY BOARD,

supra note 13 at 18-19.

2007:
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systems: (1) the child, (2) the family, (3) the community, and (4) the society.16 Researchers have identified a number of common risk and protective factors in these categories."
The child protection system's intervention on behalf of a maltreated child can
involve multiple agencies, courts, professionals, and laws. Thus lawyers and courts may
need to interpret and apply a bevy of state laws and regulations in the context of federal
law. States have four sets of laws dealing with abuse and neglect-reporting statutes,
child protective statutes, criminal statutes, and social services statutes. Definitions of
abuse and neglect may differ somewhat in each statute because the statutes serve distinct
functions. Since CAPTA, Congress has exercised extensive control over state child protection and child welfare systems by requiring states to comply with various mandates as
conditions for receiving federal funds.
An abuse or neglect case might begin with a telephone call to the state's central
"hot line" telephone number reporting suspicious circumstances, or with an emergency
call to police. The reporter may be a teacher, physician, or neighbor. After child welfare
authorities or police investigate the report, the matter may be closed because no intervention is needed, or because authorities might consider the parents' voluntary acceptance of services sufficient to remove risk to the child.
If more intensive intervention and oversight are needed, however, or if the parents
refuse to accept services voluntarily, the case may be referred to the juvenile court or
family court for an order mandating services or removing the child from the home. When
the maltreatment is severe, the criminal justice system may prosecute the perpetrators.
The civil case alone might require coordination among not only social workers, physicians, psychologists, lawyers, and judges, but also service providers in such fields as day
care, education, health care, housing assistance, benefit programs, drug and alcohol
counseling, foster care, and probation. This vast array of treatment providers suggests an
important lesson for lawyers who may encourage cooperation and bridge gaps in communication: "Child Advocacy necessarily depends on lawyers' collaboration with professionals trained in disciplines whose insights complement and enrich our own.

. .

. Child

advocates should strive for a general understanding of these disciplines but must remain
willing . . . to seek out trained professionals who know more about them than we do.""

REPORTING STATUTES AND INVESTIGATION
Statutory Structure
The identification of the battered child syndrome in 1962 was a catalyst for laws
requiring physicians to report suspected child abuse to child welfare authorities or law
enforcement. By 1967, all states had adopted such mandatory reporting laws. Within a
16
NEGLECT

DAVID THOMAS ET AL., EMERGING PRACTICES IN THE PREVENTION OF CHILD ABUSE AND

4 (2003).

17 Id.
18 DOuGLAS E. ABRAMS
PRACTICE vi (3d ed. 2007).
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few years, states had expanded the "mandated reporter" class to include other
professionals-such as teachers and social workers-who have regular contact with
children and are likely to know about the duty to report. Partly because of federal
requirements, states have also expanded the kinds of maltreatment that must be reported.
State laws still vary, however, concerning who must report, what must be reported, which
agencies (social services or law enforcement, or both) receive mandatory reports, what
penalties may be imposed for failure to report, and what civil liabilities may arise from
reporting or failing to report. In all states, reports may also be made by persons who are
not mandated reporters. Reporters may act anonymously by hot line telephone calls.
The Central Registry
Relatively few abuse and neglect reports actually reach the juvenile court or family
court because they are screened out or resolved short of adjudication. Nationwide only
about 18% of reports receive any significant intervention, and less than 3% of these
proceed to adjudication. Even when no significant intervention occurs, however, reports
may remain in a confidential central state registry to identify abusers and patterns of
abuse.19

Registries are typically accessible by government entities such as law enforcement,
departments of social services, and the judiciary. Specified private entities, such as day
care centers, youth sports programs, and other organizations that engage employees or
volunteers to work with children, may also be allowed access to screen potential applicants.20 Where state law permits such private access, the law in effect creates a duty to
investigate because failure to do so may help establish the entity's negligence in a later
damage action by the victim of maltreatment committed by the employee or volunteer.
The standard for retaining a person's name in the registry may be so broad as to raise
constitutional concerns. In Valmonte v. Bane, for example, the mother was reported as an
abuser for slapping her daughter in the face with an open hand.21 The county child
welfare agency found that the mother had engaged in excessive corporal punishment, and
the family court dismissed proceedings against her on the condition that the family
receive counseling. Despite the dismissal, the mother's name remained in the New York
state registry, which identified persons accused of abuse or neglect and communicated
their names to potential child care employers.
In Valmonte, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that listing in the
registry implicated the mother's Fourteenth Amendment due process liberty interest in
her reputation and provided insufficient safeguards to protect that interest. The risk of
erroneous listing was too great because the registry retained reports supported merely by
some credible evidence." The listed person could hold the state department of social
services to a higher standard of proof, namely a fair preponderance of the evidence, only
after being deprived of an employment opportunity solely because of inclusion in the
Central Register. In response to Valmonte, New York law now provides that disclosure to
19 See CHILD MALTREATMENT 2007:
20 See e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 210.150.
21 18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1994).

SUMMARY,

supra note 14.
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a potential employer may be made only after the listed person has had an opportunity for
an administrative hearing and a showing that the report is relevant to the prospective
employment.22

Reporters' Liability
Federal mandates require that state reporting laws grant immunity from prosecution to persons who make good faith reports of known or suspected maltreatment.2 3 In
some states, a mandated reporter who fails to report suspected abuse may be held
criminally or civilly liable under the reporting law. When there is no statutory penalty,
however, some states refuse to imply a private right to sue.2 4
Some states permit injured parties to maintain tort actions alleging that a mandated reporter failed to file a report, though Landeros v. Flood demonstrates the difficulty
of proving a claim.2 5 To establish the defendant physician's negligence for failure to
report serious abuse, the California Supreme Court required the child plaintiff to show
that the defendant "in fact observed her various injuries and in fact formed the opinion
that they were caused by other than accidental means." 2 6 Violation of the reporting act
was a misdemeanor, but Landeros held that the criminal violation did not per se establish
a civil claim. The state supreme court was concerned that creating tort liability might
result in over-reporting. A Michigan case, however, resulted in a $900,000 verdict for a
failure to report that proximately caused the child's death.27 Even when the reporting
statute does not create a private cause of action for failure to report, liability may be based
on a claim that the physician's failure to report violated professional standards of care and
thus constituted malpractice.28
Mandatory reporting acts can conflict with professional ethics codes mandating
client confidentiality. State law, for example, may mandate reports from therapists and
researchers, who may feel ethically bound to remain silent even though failure to report
might be a crime. Most state reporting laws do not require attorneys to report. 2 9 Model
Rule 1.6(b)(1) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides a limited
exception to the lawyer's obligation to maintain client confidences: "A lawyer may reveal
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary .

.

. to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm."

22 N.Y Soc. Serv. L. § 422.
23 42 U.S.C. § 5106a.
24 See, e.g., Cuyler v. United States, 362 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2004).
25 551 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1976).
26 Id. at 397.
27 Williams v. Coleman, 488 N.W.2d 464 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
28 See, e.g., Becker v. Mayo Found., 737 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. 2007).
29 See Adrienne Jennings Lockie, Salt in the Wounds: Why Attorneys Should Not Be MandatedReporters
of Child Abuse, 36 N.M. L. REV. 125 (2006).
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The literature amply demonstrates the substantial physical and emotional harm that
child abuse can cause victims immediately and in the long-term.3 0

LIMITS ON INTERVENTION
Investigations and Due Process
Searches and Inspections
A government official's entry into the home during a child maltreatment investigation constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. To examine children or inspect the home
in the absence of consent or an emergency, the social service agency must secure a warrant
by demonstrating the search's reasonableness." When their parents have not consented
for them, child victims who object to being searched are protected by the Fourth
Amendment. In determining reasonableness, a court may balance the intrusiveness of the
search against the state's compelling interest in protecting children and prosecuting
abusers. 32
Where a search by or on behalf of child protective authorities violates the Fourth
Amendment, courts have refused to apply the exclusionary rule in child protective
proceedings because exclusion of otherwise probative evidence may endanger the children's safety." The Supreme Court seems to have foreclosed the question in Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, which refused to extend the exclusionary rule to
"proceedings other than criminal trials."34 In accordance with Scott, the rule remains
applicable in parallel or later criminal proceedings charging maltreatment.
Inspections of the home or child that are part of a treatment plan or court-ordered
disposition in a child maltreatment case, however, may not implicate the Fourth Amendment. In Wyman v.James, the Supreme Court held that a welfare department caseworker's
visit to a recipient's home did not concern "any search by the ... social service agency in
the Fourth Amendment meaning of that term."" Wyman also concluded that even if the
Amendment were implicated, the proposed home visit was reasonable and thus lawful
where it was made by a caseworker, was not permitted outside working hours, and did
not involve forcible entry or snooping. The court stressed that "[tihe focus is on
the ... child who is dependent. There is no more worthy object of the public's concern.
30 See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Early Childhood, Adoption and Dependent Care,
Developmental Issuesfor Young Children in FosterCare, 106 PEDIATRICS 1145 (2000); U.S. Advisory Board, supra
note 13 at 18-19.
31 See, e.g., Doe v. Heck, 327 E3d 492 (7th Cit. 2003).
32 See, e.g., Pelster v. Walker, 185 E Supp.2d 1185 (D. Or. 2001) (in an investigation of suspected
prostitution, a body cavity search of 13- and 15-year-old girls for DNA and other evidence to identify
perpetrators was reasonable where examinations were conducted by a physician and nurse in a hospital
pursuant to a warrant).
33 See, e.g., State in re A.R., 937 P.2d 1037, 1043-44 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
34 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998).
35 400 U.S. 309, 317 (1971).
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The dependent child's needs are paramount, and only with hesitancy would we relegate
those needs, in the scale of comparative values, to a position secondary to what the mother
claims as her rights."36
Emergency Removal of the Child
In an emergency, the investigator may remove a child from the home without prior
judicial approval. The standard for emergency removal varies, with some courts requiring
only a "reasonable and articulable suspicion that the child has been abused or is in
imminent peril of abuse," but other courts requiring probable cause for suspicion.37
Self-Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination may sometimes hamper maltreatment investigations by permitting the alleged perpetrator to
remain silent, at least where he or she is not presently subject to a court order relating to
the child. In Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, the juvenile court
placed the infant under its continuing oversight by asserting jurisdiction over the mother
on a finding that she had committed serious recurring acts of physical abuse against
him." Shortly afterwards, the mother regained custody after signing a court-approved
protective supervision order, which she later violated in nearly every respect. After reports
of further serious abuse, the juvenile court ordered the mother to produce the child or
reveal his whereabouts.
The Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that the limited testimonial assertion inherent in producing the child would be sufficiently incriminating to trigger the
Fifth Amendment privilege, but concluded that the challenged production order fell
within the "required records" exception to the privilege. This exception removes Fifth
Amendment protection from production of records that claimants must keep for the
public benefit pursuant to "an essentially non-criminal and regulatory area of inquiry."39
Bouknight held that the challenged production order fell within the recognized exception
because the mother was the child's custodian pursuant to a juvenile court order that had
required production of the child as part of a non-criminal regulatory scheme. 40
The Court left open the possibility that in later criminal proceedings against the
mother, the Fifth Amendment privilege might limit the state's ability to use the
testimonial aspects of her act of production. In a later civil abuse or neglect proceeding,
however, the court may draw a negative inference against a party invoking the privilege,
provided some other evidence supports the inference. 4 1
36 Id. at 318.
37 See Gomes v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 2006) (discussing the split among the federal
courts of appeals).

38 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
39 Id. at 556-57.
40 Id. at 559.
41 See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
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Grounds for Intervention
As noted at the beginning of this article, the state's parens patriae authority to
intervene in family life to protect children is limited by the parents' constitutional rights
to family integrity and to direct their children's upbringing. Identifying the boundaries
of these limits, however, can be quite difficult in particular cases. Two recurrent issues are
the degree of actual or threatened harm the state must show before it may intervene, and
the level of assistance the state must provide to help the family resolve the risk before
removing the child.
Both issues were addressed in In rejuvenile Appeal, which concerned a Connecticut
mother of six children who was a welfare recipient known to the state Department of
Children and Youth Services. 42 When her youngest child, a nine-month-old infant, died
of unknown causes, the department removed the other children on an emergency basis.
At an ex parte hearing two days after the death, the trial court granted the department
temporary custody of the children to safeguard their welfare.
The state supreme court remanded with orders to set aside the temporary custody
order because it found post-emergency intervention and removal unsupported by the
requisite compelling state interest. The state's interest in intervention is compelling only
when the children face serious physical illness, injury, or immediate physical danger. At
the ex parte custody hearing, the state failed to show that the infant's death was caused
by abuse; indeed an autopsy completed after the hearing exonerated the mother. The
court held that removing the children from the home should be a remedy of last resort,
used only when necessary to ensure their safety. "Even where the parent-child relationship
is 'marginal,' it is usually in the best interests of the child to remain at home and still
benefit from a family environment. "4
Statutes and regulations often define abuse and neglect broadly in an effort to
effectuate their child protective purposes, but breadth has its limits. Where the basis for
state intervention in abuse or neglect cases appears tenuous, the due process void-forvagueness doctrine may sometimes limit authority to intervene. The doctrine requires
that a statute define its proscriptions "with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement. "44 Vagueness defenses appear most frequently in criminal prosecutions, but may also appear in civil proceedings controlled by statutes that, like
child maltreatment statutes, enforce state-imposed obligations. Courts tend to reject
vagueness challenges where the parent's conduct would appear clearly abusive or neglectful to reasonable persons, but vagueness challenges sometimes succeed where the wrongfulness of a parent's conduct is open to fair question.

42 455 A.2d 1313 (Conn. 1983).
43 Id. at 1319.
44 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
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PATTERNS OF ABUSE AND NEGLECT
This section identifies major categories of abuse and neglect. The section distinguishes between the two because state laws and reporting statistics frequently draw the
distinction, even though cases frequently contain elements of both. For example, a case
may concern malnourished children living without adequate medical care in a filthy
home (indicia of neglect), but these children may also suffer from bruises, cuts, bumps,
and burns (indicia of abuse). Symptoms of neglect also may precede physical abuse.
Because abuse and neglect overlap in so many cases, some authorities prefer using
"maltreatment," the broader term introduced earlier in this article, to encompass all
forms of physical or emotional injury to a child.

Neglect
The General Concept
The United States Department of Health and Human Services identifies seven
specific varieties of physical neglect that recur in the case law:
* Refusal of Health Care [Failure to provide or allow needed care in accord with
recommendations of a competent health care professional for a physical injury,
illness, medical condition, or impairment.]
* Delay in Health Care (Failure to seek timely and appropriate medical care for a
serious health problem that any reasonable layman would have recognized as
needing professional medical attention.]
* Abandonment [Desertion of a child without arranging for reasonable care and
supervision. This category included cases in which children were not claimed
within two days and cases where children were left with parents/substitutes who
gave no (or false) information about their whereabouts.]
* Expulsion [Other blatant refusals of custody, such as permanent or indefinite
expulsion of a child from the home without adequate arrangement for care by
others or refusal to accept custody of a returned runaway.]
* Other Custody Issues [Custody-related forms of inattention to the child's needs
other than those covered by abandonment or expulsion. For example, repeated
shuttling of a child from one household to another, due to apparent unwillingness to maintain custody, or chronically and repeatedly leaving a child with
others for days or weeks at a time.)
* Inadequate Supervision [Child left unsupervised or inadequately supervised for
extended periods of time or allowed to remain away from home overnight
without the parent/substitute knowing (or attempting to determine) the child's
whereabouts.]
45 See, e.g., In re S.T., 928 P.2d 393 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
46 See VINCENT J. FONTANA & DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, sapra note 3.
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Other Physical Neglect [Conspicuous inattention to avoidable hazards in the home;
inadequate nutrition, clothing, or hygiene; and other forms of reckless disregard
of the child's safety and welfare, such as driving with the child while intoxicated,
leaving a young child unattended in a motor vehicle, and so forth.Jo
A high percentage of maltreatment reports concern neglect, and a majority of
neglect removal cases involve low-income families. The correlation between poverty and
child maltreatment is not surprising, given the devastating impact poverty can have on
families and children, negatively affecting parenting ability, access to necessities, and the
child's environment. Poverty is associated with insufficient, unsafe housing and even
homelessness, a lack of medical care, low quality day care, substandard education, and
violence. Children living in poverty are more likely to have poor health, developmental
delays and learning disabilities, less education, more emotional and behavioral problems,
and various other problems than non-poor children.
The parents' poverty is no longer a per se basis for a neglect finding. Statutes may
specify that a neglect finding may be predicated on the parents' not providing adequate
food, shelter, or clothing, but only where the parents are financially able to provide these
necessities or have been offered state assistance. The risk remains, however, that neglect
may be found even though the parents' deficiencies stem primarily from financial distress
rather than from intentional failure to meet their children's basic needs. Low-income
parents often live in substandard housing and their diets often fall short of recognized
nutritional guidelines, for example. Where no clinic is available, the hospital emergency
room is the primary health care facility used by many low-income households; repeated
appearances frequently arouse suspicion of neglect or abuse. If a low-income family
receives public assistance, the family's required contacts with the social services agency
give the parents a higher profile with state authorities, and thus may make them more
susceptible to identification for maltreatment. In severe economic times, the parents'
homelessness or unemployment may invite state intervention if these setbacks leave the
children without a regular domestic environment.
Failure to Protect
Parents are responsible for protecting their children from harm when they can do
so. A parent who fails to intervene to protect a child (or who takes insufficient protective
action) can be adjudicated neglectful, even though the parent was not the actual abuser
of the child. Parents who fail to protect a child can have the child removed from their care
and, when the maltreatment is severe, may even have parental rights terminated.
The state frequently alleges failure to protect when a mother does not intervene to
her
children being abused by their father, stepfather, or another male partner. In In
stop
re CraigT., for example, a mother was adjudicated neglectful because she did nothing to
protect her three-year-old son from an assault by his father in a shopping mall parking lot
J.

SEDLAK & DIANE D. BROADHURST, THIRD NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF
47 See ANDREA
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 2-16 to 2-17 (U.S. Dep't of HHS 1996).

48 U.S.

ADVISORY BOARD,

supra note 13.
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and denied that the assault had occurred.4 ' No evidence indicated that she was afraid to
intervene, and the New Hampshire trial court concluded that she was complicit in the
attack. She also failed to protect her five-year-old daughter from witnessing the attack,
which was so severe that it horrified witnesses.
In In re TG., the South Dakota Supreme Court upheld termination of parental
rights of a mother who did not physically or sexually abuse her daughters but allowed
them to travel with a known sexual abuser.o Further she knew that the children's
stepfather had been convicted of child molestation and that he was abusing the daughters, but she nonetheless chose to live with him and expose the girls to him. She even
tried to stop the children from discussing the abuse with authorities.
Where a battered woman, herself a victim, does not separate herself and the
children from the barterer, she generally can be held responsible for failing to protect
the children. Children are psychologically harmed by exposure to domestic violence
and are also at risk of being physically harmed." Some women domestic violence
victims have successfully argued, however, that placing the children in foster care is
not an appropriate remedy, but that rather the state should assist the mother in her
efforts to escape the violence.52 Some courts have also allowed a mother to use a battered woman syndrome defense when the state seeks to terminate her rights for failure
to protect.5 3
Parents may also be found neglectful, and may even suffer termination of parental
rights, when their failure to cooperate with the state in an abuse investigation leaves the
perpetrator unidentified and the child at risk of future harm.5 4

Failure to Thrive
Failure to thrive, or growth deficiency, is a condition in which the child's weight
and linear growth have fallen below standard measures or have significantly dropped
without a physical cause. Children untreated can suffer permanent physical, cognitive,
and behavioral problems. "Failure to thrive (FTT) in infants and children results from
inadequate nutrition to maintain physical growth and development.

. .

. In its extreme

form, FTT secondary to neglect may be fatal."55

49 744 A.2d 621 (N.H. 1999).
50 578 N.W.2d 921 (S.D. 1998).
51 See, e.g., NAOMI R. CAHN, CHILD WITNESSING OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, IN HANDBOOK OF
CHILDREN, CULTURE, AND VIOLENCE 3 (Nancy E. Dowd, Dorothy G. Singer & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds.,
2006).
52 See, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 203 E Supp.2d 153 (E.D.N.Y 2002).
53 See, e.g., In re Betty J.W., 371 S.E.2d 326 (W.Va. 1988).
54 See, e.g., In re Jeffrey R.L., 435 S.E.2d 162 (W.Va. 1993) (upholding termination of parental
rights to a three-month-old infant who suffered from battered child syndrome and could not safely be
returned home because perpetrator was unknown).
55 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Child Abuse and Neglect and Comm. on Nutrition, Failure
to Thrive as a Manifestation of Child Neglect, 116 PEDIATRICS 1234 (Nov. 2005).
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Because "growth variants are common" in children, authorities seeking to prove
FTT must show by expert testimony that the child started normally but failed to grow.' 6
The showing is essential because FTT may also result from a medical condition without
neglect:
FTT can be unintentional, occurring with breastfeeding difficulties, errors in formula
preparation, poor diet selection, or improper feeding technique. FTT can also be caused by
organic diseases including but not limited to cystic fibrosis, cerebral palsy, HIV infection or
AIDS, inborn errors of metabolism, celiac disease, renal disease, lead poisoning, or major
cardiac disease. FTT may result if caregivers who are referred for assistance fail to avail
themselves of community resources and/or assistance. FTT is often multifactorial, involving
some combination of infant organic disease, subtle neurologic and/or behavioral problems,
dysfunctional parenting behaviors, and parent-child interactional difficulties. Feeding difficulties, oral-motor dysfunction, food aversion, and/or appetite control often compound the
problem.5

Psychological Maltreatment

The General Concept
The American Academy of Pediatrics defines "psychological maltreatment" as "a
repeated pattern of damaging interactions between parent(s) and child that becomes
typical of the relationship. In some situations, the pattern is chronic and pervasive; in
others, the pattern occurs only when triggered by alcohol or other potentiating factors."5 8
Psychological maltreatment occurs "when a person conveys to a child that he or she is
worthless, flawed, unloved, unwanted, endangered, or only of value in meeting another's
needs. The perpetrator may spurn, terrorize, isolate, or ignore or impair the child's
socialization."
Psychological maltreatment may be coupled with physical neglect or abuse, or it
may occur separately. State statutes may not distinguish among emotional neglect,
emotional abuse, and the emotional harm caused by physical neglect or abuse. An
emotional neglect case also may be brought under more general statutory language such
as "an environment injurious to the child's welfare." Acts of physical violence toward the
child, including acts inflicted during efforts at discipline, may also support an emotional
abuse finding. In some jurisdictions, a threat of emotional harm without a showing of
actual harm is sufficient. 6 0
Statutes that do specifically address psychological maltreatment may focus on the
condition of the child. In Minnesota, for example, neglect includes "emotional harm from
a pattern of behavior which contributes to impaired emotional functioning of the child
56 Id. See also, e.g., In re S.PW., 761 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
57 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Failureto Thrive, supra note 55.
58 See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect, The PsychologicalMaltreatment of Children-TechnicalReport, 109 PEDIATRIcs 68 (2002).

59 Id
60 In re Matthew S., 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 139 (Ct. App. 1996). See also, e.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, supra
note 58.
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which may be demonstrated by a substantial and observable effect in the child's behavior,
emotional response, or cognition that is not within the normal range for the child's age
and stage of development, with due regard to the child's culture."61 Statutes may also
focus on parental behavior, such as persistent negative or belittling parental communications and interactions with children.
Expert Testimony
Evidence of emotional abuse or emotional neglect may be elusive because it usually
consists of a pattern of behavior, without physical injury or an identifiable specific act or
precipitating incident. The effects of emotional maltreatment may be incremental and
cumulative for months or years. Even where a clear pattern appears, a causal relationship
between the emotional maltreatment and resulting psychological harm may be difficult
to establish. Causation may be demonstrated by documenting the dates and times of the
alleged abusive acts and by identifying who was present each time. Psychiatric and
psychological evaluation and testimony may be required. Because of difficulties of proof,
some juvenile officers do not file an emotional abuse petition unless expert testimony will
support it.

Expert testimony typically is also used to establish "failure to thrive." The physician
first provides testimony that establishes "failure to thrive" symptoms and then rules out
medical causes for the child's delayed development.
Abuse
The General Question of Proof
Physical abuse is "characterized by inflicting physical injury by punching, beating,
kicking, biting, burning, or otherwise harming a child. Although the injury is not an
accident, the parent or caretaker may not have intended to hurt the child. The injury may
have resulted from overdiscipline or physical punishment that is inappropriate for the
child's age." 62
To sustain allegations of physical abuse, generally medical evidence must establish
that the child's injury was not accidental. Even where the parties present no eyewitness
testimony concerning the acts of abuse, a physician's testimony (accompanied by photographs and x-rays when appropriate) demonstrating that the injuries were nonaccidental may constitute substantial evidence of abuse.6 3
Several common pathological conditions tend to suggest that the child's injuries
were unlikely to have been self-inflicted. These conditions include, for example, patterned abrasions consisting of marks or bruises whose shape, size, and severity suggest
61

MINN. STAT.

§

626.556(9).

62

NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A SHARED
COMMUNITY CONCERN 2 (U.S. Dep't of HHS 1992).

63 See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS,
§ 6.8, at 6-21 to 6-23 (3d ed. 2007).

CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, IN MISSOURI JUVENILE LAW,

ch. 6,
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they were produced by objects such as belts, cords, or sticks; patterned burns suggesting
the child was held in scalding water or burned with cigarettes or other objects; and,
particularly in young children, spiral fractures of the upper arm or leg indicating a
twisting motion unlikely to have occurred by accident.
Physicians can also give expert testimony about the means used to inflict the injury
and whether the explanation given for the injuries is reasonable. A parent, for example,
may give an explanation that is unlikely to explain the injury (e.g., that the child fell
from a chair causing multiple, fatal injuries); or that is implausible (e.g., that an infant
climbed up to and turned on a hot water faucet); or that conflicts with the explanation
given by the other parent.

The Battered Child Syndrome
Some parents not only neglect their children's needs, but also beat, maim, tie up,
torture, or even murder their children. In Deborah S. v. Superior Court, for example, the
five-year-old California child had old and new bone fractures, scars and other eye injuries,
missing teeth, multiple bruises and scars in various degrees of healing, and healed scalp
lacerations.6 All these injuries had been inflicted by his mother, who had also periodically confined the boy to his room, to a crib and to a closet, and had tied his wrists and
ankles together with a sock in his mouth to prevent him from screaming.
Particularly when the child is young and has suffered multiple injuries over time,
the child may fit the battered child syndrome, a condition identified in an influential
article by Dr. C. Henry Kempe and his colleagues in 1962.6 The battered child syndrome
may occur at any age, but, in general, the affected children are younger than three years. In
some instances the clinical manifestations are limited to those resulting from a single
episode of trauma, but more often the child's general health is below par, and he shows
evidence of neglect including poor skin hygiene, multiple soft tissue injuries, and malnutrition. One often obtains a history of previous episodes suggestive of parental neglect or
trauma. A marked discrepancy between clinical findings and historical data as supplied by
67
the parents is a major diagnostic feature of the battered child syndrome.
The battered child is often admitted to the hospital during evening hours and often
has had multiple visits to various hospitals. Parents frequently appear reluctant to give
the physician or medical staff information about the child, the history or the present
injuries. The parents may react inappropriately to news of an injury's severity, such as by
appearing relatively calm to the diagnosis of a fractured femur. Significant inconsistencies
between parents' explanations of injuries and the diagnosed condition, gaps between the
estimated time of injury and the date of treatment, and an unusually confused social
history also suggest a dysfunctional family. The child may have previous injuries in
various stages of healing. Abuse may be shown where no new injuries occur while the

64

SeeJOHN E. B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD,
65 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1996).
66 C. HENRY KEMPE ET AL., supra note 11.

67 Id. at 17-18.
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child is hospitalized or in a protective environment. Especially in cases of serious abuse,
the child appears frequently withdrawn, non-communicative, and developmentally far
below chronological age. Speech, language, and behavior patterns appear retarded and
not age appropriate.6
In both criminal and civil cases, the battered child syndrome has become a wellrecognized medical diagnosis that can be established through expert testimony,
which indicates (without identifying the perpetrator) that the child's injuries were not
accidental.
The Shaken Baby Syndrome
The shaken baby syndrome, identified in the early 1970s, is "a serious form of child
maltreatment most often involving children younger than 2 years but may be seen in
children up to 5 years old. "69 The maltreatment is caused by a person who severely shakes
an infant, resulting in whiplash-type injuries. No external injury is seen, but the shaking
can cause blindness, severe brain injury, and even death. A combination of factors,
including the infant's weak neck muscles and relatively large head, result in the injury.
Controversy surrounds the scientific validity of the syndrome, however, particularly when
diagnosis is based solely on retinal and brain hemorrhages. The National Institute of
Neurological Disorders and Stroke has a more expansive list of injuries: "subdural
hemorrhages (bleeding in the brain), retinal hemorrhages (bleeding in the retina),
damage to the spinal cord and neck, and fractures of the ribs and bones."7O Death occurs
in 15% to 38% of shaken baby syndrome cases."
The Target Child
Some parents single out one child for abuse while leaving other children in the
household unharmed. Social workers investigating abuse may see the unharmed children
and either remain unaware of the "target child's" presence, or assume the child is safe
because the other children appear well. Proper training for social workers should emphasize the necessity for careful attention to all children in a household.72
Corporal Punishment
The General Concept
Abuse may result from misguided efforts to discipline a child through corporal
punishment such as spanking. As a general matter, "[clorporal punishment involves the
68 Id.
69 Comm. on Child Abuse and Neglect, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Shaken Baby Syndrome: Rotational
CranialInjuries-TechnicalReport, 108 PEDIATRICS 206 (July 2001).
70 National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/
shakenbaby/shakenbaby.htm#.
71 Id.
72 See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, supra note 18 at 330-31.
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application of some form of physical pain in response to undesirable behavior. Corporal
punishment ranges from slapping the hand of a child about to touch a hot stove to
identifiable child abuse, such as beatings, scaldings, and burnings.""
Commentators continue to disagree about the efficacy of corporal punishment amid
changing social mores.74 Both criminal and civil law in the United States, however, have
traditionally found reasonable corporal punishment of children justified and thus not
abusive. Many parents thus seek to justify physical abuse by characterizing their conduct
as reasonable and necessary discipline.
Section 147 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that a parent "is privileged to apply such reasonable force or to impose such reasonable confinement upon his
child as he reasonably believes to be necessary for its proper control, training, or education." Section 150 of the Restatement considers these factors in determining the reasonableness of punishment: whether the actor is a parent; the child's age, sex, and physical
and mental condition; the nature of the child's offense and his apparent motive; the
influence of his example upon other children of the same family or group; whether the
force or confinement is reasonably necessary and appropriate to compel obedience to a
proper command; and whether it is disproportionate to the offense, unnecessarily degrading, or likely to cause serious or permanent harm.
A child protection act's definition of "abuse" may be critical to determining
whether corporal punishment exceeds the bounds of reasonableness. Some jurisdictions
require a showing of actual harm, but other jurisdictions find abusive discipline on proof
of a substantial risk of serious injury, without the need to show substantial injury itself."

Domestic Violence Statutes
Some children have successfully used domestic violence statutes to secure court
orders of protection against their abusive parents. In Beermann v. Beermann, for example,
the South Dakota court granted a protective order to a fourteen-year-old girl who wanted
to continue to visit her father, but wanted him to stop his abusive behavior during her
visits. 6 The court noted a number of advantages to using the domestic violence statute
rather than the child protection statute, including that the domestic violence victim
could fill out the standard forms herself and could get immediate relief.

73 Committee on Psychosocial Aspects of Child & Family Health, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Guidance
for Effective Discipline, 101 PEDIATRICS 723 (1998).
74 See, e.g., Stanford B. Friedman et al., The Short- and Long-Term Consequences of Corporal Punishment;
Introduction, 98 PEDIATRICS vi (1996).
75 See, e.g., Raboin v. North Dakota Dep't of Human Servs., 552 N.W2d 329, 334 (N.D. 1996)
(corporal punishment administered by the parents with a wooden or plastic spoon or belt that caused slight
bruising on the children's buttocks did not yet demonstrate "serious physical harm or traumatic abuse as a
result of the parents' spankings"); In re C. Children, 583 N.YS.2d 499, 500 (App. Div. 1992) ("It is sufficient
to show that the child was subjected to a substantial risk of physical injury").
76 559 N.W.2d 868 (S.D. 1997).
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Sexual Abuse
Sexual abuse cases comprise a relatively small percentage of the overall child
protective services caseload (about 10%), but surveys of adults have indicated that as
many as a million children may be victimized each year.n Because of shame and embarrassment, sexual abuse is underreported by child and adult victims alike."
According to the American Academy of Pediatrics,
[sjexual abuse occurs when a child is engaged in sexual activities that he or she cannot
comprehend, for which he or she is developmentally unprepared and cannot give consent,
and/or that violate the law or social taboos of society. The sexual activities may include all
forms of oral-genital, genital, or anal contact by or to the child or abuse that does not
involve contact, such as exhibitionism, voyeurism, or using the child in the production of
pornography.... Sexual abuse includes a spectrum of activities ranging from rape to
0
physically less intrusive sexual abuse.
Usually the sex abuser is known to the victim. Men are more likely than women to
be the abusers. Girls are at higher risk of sexual abuse, although boys may be less likely
to report because of the shame of being a victim and concerns about being labeled
homosexual.o Female children whose parents have divorced "face a significantly elevated
risk of being sexually abused by either a parent, a parent's partner, or a person outside the
home.""
Even in a civil case where the burden of proof is lower than in criminal cases,
proving child sexual abuse is often difficult because of a lack of physical evidence or of
adult witnesses other than the perpetrator (or at least none willing to testify). Requiring
a child to testify can be traumatic, even where the state invokes the child witness
protection law, which typically permits child victims of maltreatment to testify by
82
videotape or closed-circuit television in civil proceedings and criminal prosecutions.
Some jurisdictions have amended their evidence rules to facilitate the use of a child's
out-of-court statements because the child victim called to testify in a civil proceeding
might be unwilling to give accurate information, might not be found competent, or
might make a poor witness.
In the end, evidentiary difficulties may lead the juvenile court to base its decision
on other grounds, such as parental unfitness, even when evidence of sexual abuse exists."

77 See Diana J. English, The Extent and Consequences of Child Maltreatment, 8 THE FUTURE OF
39 (Spring 1998).
78 See, e.g., William Winslade et al., CastratingPedophiles Convicted of Sex Offenses Against Children:
New Treatment or Old Punishment?, 51 SMU L. REV. 349, 357-60 (1998).
79 Am. Academy of Pediatrics, The Evaluation of Sexual Abuse in Children, 116 PEDIATRICS 506
(2005).
80 See, e.g., William Winslade et al., supra note 78 at 357-60.
81 Robin Fretwell Wilson, Children at Risk: The Sexual Exploitation of Female Children After Divorce,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 252 (2001).
82 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (upholding child witness protection law against Sixth
Amendment confrontation clause challenge).
83 See, e.g., Adoption of Quentin, 678 N.E.2d 1325 (Mass. 1997).
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Newborns with Positive Toxicologies
Babies are more likely to be born healthy if their mothers have prenatal medical
care, receive good nutrition, and abstain from alcohol, tobacco, and controlled substances
during pregnancy. In the child abuse and neglect context, much attention has focused on
pregnant women's use of illegal drugs.
As a federal funding eligibility requirement, the Keeping Children and Families
Safe Act of 2003 requires states to notify child protective services if a newborn exhibits
symptoms of prenatal exposure to illegal drugs. The Act addresses only illegal drugs,
even though alcohol is a greater problem. "The consensus ... at this point," says one
leading physician, "is that most of the adverse effects that had been reported due to
cocaine and crack use were from alcohol use . . . [Alcohol] is the leading cause of birth
defects due to an ingested environmental substance in [America}."85 Smoking during
pregnancy is also very harmful to the fetus.
Some states explicitly define neglect to include prenatal exposure to a controlled
substance. Minnesota, for example, provides that neglect includes "prenatal exposure to
a controlled substance . . . used by the mother for a nonmedical purpose, as evidenced by

withdrawal symptoms in the child at birth, results of a toxicology test performed on the
mother at delivery or the child at birth, or medical effects or developmental delays during
the child's first year of life that medically indicate prenatal exposure to a controlled
substance." 6 In other states, however, a positive toxicology for a controlled substance
alone does not prove abuse because it fails to establish that the infant will be at
substantial risk; a positive toxicology report in conjunction with other evidence, however,
may support a neglect finding."
Experts disagree about whether drug-using pregnant women should face criminal
prosecution or be committed civilly for treatment. It has been argued that minority and
poor female substance abusers are considerably more likely to be reported to authorities
than other women." Many medical associations oppose prosecution of mothers who
deliver babies harmed by substance abuse during pregnancy because they believe that the
threat of prosecution would deter many expectant mothers from seeking drug treatment
and general prenatal care. 9
Nationwide, prosecutions under child endangerment and criminal abuse statutes
have generally failed because courts have held that a fetus is not a "child" within the
meaning of these statutes, or that prosecution for prenatal substance abuse was outside

84 P.L. 108-36.
85 Linda Carroll, Alcohol's Toll on Fetuses: Even Worse Than Thought, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 4, 2003, at Fl
(quoting Dr. Kenneth Warren, of the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism).
86 MINN. STAT. § 626.556(2)(0(6).
87 See, e.g., In re Dante M., 661 N.E.2d 138 (N.Y 1995).
88 See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, PunishingDrug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and
the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1419 (1991).
89 See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass'n, Bd. of Trustees, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered
Medical Treatments and Legal Penaltiesfor Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 J. AM. MED.
Ass'N 2663, 2667 (1990).
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legislative intent.90 Perhaps because of reliance on statutory interpretation, most courts
have not wrestled with constitutional questions of whether prosecution of addicted
pregnant mothers would violate their equal protection, procedural due process, or substantive due process privacy rights or whether prosecution would constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.91 In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, however, the Supreme Court held
that the defendant state hospital violated the Fourth Amendment by performing diagnostic urine tests on pregnant women without their informed consent and then providing
positive test results to police for possible prosecution for cocaine use. 92 Ferguson concluded
that the interest in threatening criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using
cocaine did not justify departure from the general rule that the Amendment prohibits an
official nonconsensual search without a valid warrant.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES
No Duty to Intervene
In DeShaney v Winnebago County DepartmentofSocial Services, the Supreme Court held
that due process does not impose an affirmative obligation on states to protect persons,
including children, from harm." The DeShaney plaintiffs were a mother and her son
Joshua, a four-year-old beaten and permanently injured by his father, with whom he had
lived. The defendants were social workers and local officials who had received reports that
the boy was being abused, had reason to believe the reports were true, but did not remove
him from his father's custody. In January 1982, the Department of Social Services (DSS)
investigated the complaints Joshua's stepmother made to police and concluded that no
action was needed. A year later, DSS obtained a court order placing Joshua in the
temporary custody of a hospital that had reported the boy as abused. The case was
dismissed and Joshua was returned to his father, who had agreed to DSS requirements.
DSS assigned a caseworker to make monthly visits to Joshua's home and received two
more hospital reports of abuse. The agency also received neighbors' reports of abuse
through police. The caseworker visited the home almost twenty times, recorded incidents
of abuse, but did nothing more.
DeShaney held that Fourteenth Amendment due process limits the state's power to
act, but does not guarantee persons minimal levels of safety and security against the
violence or other conduct of private actors. Nor does due process confer an affirmative
right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or
property interests.
DeShaney also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that a "special relationship" existed
between the state and Joshua because the state had undertaken to protect him from harm.
90 See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 137 P.3d 1195, 1196 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
91 See, e.g., Margaret P. Spencer, ProsecutorialImmunity: The Response to PrenatalDrug Use, 25 CONN.
L. REv. 393, 410-26 (1993).
92 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
93 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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The injuries inflicted on the boy occurred not while he was in state custody, but while he
was in the custody of his father, who was not a state actor. According to the Court, by
returning the child to his father's custody, the state placed him in a situation that was no
worse than if the state had not acted at all.

Tort Liability
DeShaney did not foreclose state tort remedies for children injured in Joshua
DeShaney's circumstances, but barriers exist even in states that do not invoke sovereign
immunity to preclude tort recovery. In Boland v. State, for example, a child died from a
beating before the agency received and investigated a misrouted hotline telephone
report.94 New York's intermediate appellate court held that the claimant father had
demonstrated a special relationship between the child and the state because the "detailed
and comprehensive statutory scheme at issue . . . was designed to protect a discrete and
limited class of individuals," namely abused children.95 The court also held that the father
had demonstrated that the state officer negligently failed to perform a ministerial
act-routing the hotline call to the correct child protective office.
The father lost, however, because he failed to establish proximate causation. Boland
required proof that:
had the hotline report been correctly routed in the first instance, a timely investigation
would have ensued, with the investigator assigned to the case interviewing the stepmother
and the children prior to the infliction of [the victim's] fatal injuries and, based upon such
interview, concluding that the stepmother posed such an imminent danger to the children's
96
health that they would have been summarily removed from the home.

Systemic Problems
Unfortunately, the lack of intervention that resulted in Joshua DeShaney's injuries
is all too likely to happen again. A U.S. General Accounting Office study of selected child
protective services offices found that "{ijncreases in the number of maltreatment cases,
the changing nature of family problems, and long-standing systemic weaknesses have
placed the CPS [Child Protective Services} system in a state of crisis and undermined its
ability to fully carry out the responsibilities for abused and neglected children."97
The report pinpointed three chronic problems:
First, child maltreatment reports have risen steadily across the country. The caseloads of CPS
units have grown correspondingly, and CPS units often cannot keep pace with this workload. Second, these caseloads are increasingly composed of families whose problems have
grown more troubling and complicated, with substance abuse a common and pervasive
94 638 N.YS.2d 500 (App. Div. 1996).
95 Id. at 506.
96 Boland v. State, 693 N.YS.2d 748 (App. Div. 1999).

97 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES: COMPLEX CHALLENGES
REQUIRE NEW STRATEGIES 4 (1997).
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condition. Finally, systemic weaknesses-such as difficulty maintaining a professional and
skilled workforce, inconsistently implementing policies and procedures, a lack of automated
case management in recordkeeping systems, and poor working relationships between CPS
and the courts-have further weakened CPS units.98

The GAO concluded that "[t~he combined effect of difficult caseloads and systemic
weaknesses (1) overburdens caseworkers and dilutes the quality of their response to
families and (2) may further endanger the lives of children coming to the attention of
CPS.""9

A more recent evaluation of state child welfare systems found that no states met
federal performance standards for the goals of safety, permanency, and well-being for
children in foster care or receiving in-home services.o

Wrongful Removal
DeShaney stemmed from failure to remove the child from the parent, but children
can also suffer harm from unnecessary or improper removal. Nonetheless, it has been held
that parents cannot maintain a federal suit against caseworkers or the department of social
services attorney for bringing a dependency action that resulted in a wrongful removal.
In Ernst v. Child and Youth Services, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit conferred absolute immunity on child welfare workers on the ground that they act
in a quasi-prosecutorial capacity in dependency proceedingslor.
Like a prosecutor, a child welfare worker must exercise independent judgment in deciding
whether or not to bring a child dependency proceeding, and such judgment would likely be
compromised if the worker faced the threat of personal liability for every mistake in
judgment. Certainly, we want our child welfare workers to exercise care in deciding to
interfere in parent-child relationships. But we do not want them to be so overly cautious,
out of fear of personal liability, that they fail to intervene in situations in which children are
in danger. 0 2

THE REASONABLE EFFORTS REQUIREMENT
During some periods of our nation's history, removing maltreated children from

their parents was considered the best approach to child protection. Placing the children
in institutions or with other families was considered sounder policy than trying to

98 Id.
99 Id.
100 CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FEDERAL CHILD AND
FAMILY SERVICES REVIEW: GENERAL FINDINGS (2004).
101 108 F.3d 486 (3d Cir. 1997).
102 Id. at 496.
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rehabilitate the parents. In other periods, however, removal was considered less desirable
because of concerns about family integrity and the harm caused to children by removal
and extended foster care placement.o 3
After years of debate on these issues and documentation of children harmed by
removal, Congress passed the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
(AACWA). The Act was intended to require states to keep abused or neglected children
in their own homes when possible and to require states to move aggressively to reunite
the family when removal was necessary. If reunification was not possible within a
reasonable time, the child would be placed for adoption. AACWA makes eligibility for
specified federal funding contingent on a state's agreement, before placing a child in
foster care, that the state will make reasonable efforts "to prevent or eliminate the need
for removal of the child from his home, and . . . to make it possible for the child to return

to his home."o 4
By 1997, however, Congress had become concerned that the states were making too
much, rather than too little, effort to reunite families of abused and neglected children.
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) requires states to meet stringent
time requirements for terminating parental rights when children cannot be returned
home. The Act also specifies that in some cases, states are not required to make reasonable
efforts to reunite families before moving to terminate parental rights. Reasonable efforts
are not required when the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances
such as abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, or sexual abuse; when parental rights of the
parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily; or when the parent has:
(I) committed murder . .. of another child of the parent; (II) committed voluntary manslaughter . . . of another child of the parent; (III) aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or
solicited to commit such a murder or such a voluntary manslaughter; or (IV) committed a
felony assault that results in serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the
parent.15

Some critics charge that despite the reasonable efforts requirement, states often do
not provide adequate services to parents of maltreated children. Because of funding
limitations, the services provided may not be appropriate to the parents' needs or may not
continue for a sufficient time. Disagreement also persists concerning the proper division
of responsibility between the child protective system and the welfare system, and
between parents and the state.
Problems with housing illustrate these controversies. Homelessness is a significant
factor leading to foster care placements. Some state courts have held that the social
services agency can be ordered to provide housing as part of a reasonable efforts requirement when family reunification cannot otherwise be achieved because of the family's
homelessness. In In re Nicole G., for example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected
the agency's arguments that the "{1}egislature did not create or envision it as a housing
103 See, e.g., DouGLAs E. ABRAMS, supra note 10 at 22-27, 79, 170, 173.

104 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B).
105 Id. § 671(a) (15) (D).
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or income-maintenance agency," and "that if the court may order it to make rentalsubsidy payments, critical moneys and energies will be diverted from its primary mission
of preserving and reunifying families."o 6
Some courts, however, have interpreted the reasonable efforts requirement to allow
removal of a child because the home was filthy, without requiring the state to provide a
cleaning service that would be substantially less expensive than foster care. In In re
N.M.W., for example, the Iowa Court of Appeals found that the chronic unsanitary
conditions of the mother's apartment were sufficient basis for a neglect adjudication
because they presented health hazards, especially animal feces scattered throughout the
living area."' Even in the absence of actual harm, the court permitted the agency to
remove the child as a preventive measure. The mother was told she could regain custody
of the child when she removed the pets and cleaned the apartment, but she did neither.

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
When the state's efforts to keep a family together fail, the state may move to
terminate parental rights, typically to free the child for permanent placement, with
adoption usually preferred. Termination generally severs all parent-child ties permanently, particularly when the child is being freed for adoption by strangers. After
termination, for example, the parent usually becomes a legal stranger to the child so that
the child has no right to support or inheritance from the parent, and the parent has no
right to see the child or know the child's whereabouts.
Because termination is such a drastic remedy (sometimes called the "death sentence" of maltreatment law), the Supreme Court has been sympathetic to parents'
arguments that termination proceedings should carry greater due process protections
than the usual civil case. Making termination of parental rights more difficult, however,
is not necessarily in the best interests of maltreated children, who may end up consigned
to "foster care limbo," unable to return to the abusive or neglectful home but also not free
for adoption. This section concerns parents' due process protections and then examines
some grounds for termination not seen in the decisions discussed earlier in this article.
Due Process Protections for Parents
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court held, 5-4, that due
process does not require appointment of counsel for indigent parents in all termination
proceedings, but rather permits the trial court to determine the need for appointment on
a case-by-case basis.' Lassiter determined the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim
by applying the three factors identified in Mathews v. Eldridge: "the private interests at
stake, the government's interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to
106 577 A.2d 248, 250 (R.I. 1990).
107 461 N.W.2d 478 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).

108 452 U.S. 18 (1981).

Ramsey and Abrams / A PRIMER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT LAW

1 25

erroneous decisions."'
"A parent's desire for and right to the 'companionship, care,
custody and management of his or her children,"' Lassiter began, "is an important interest
that 'undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection."o The indigent parent's interest, however, was not strong enough to prevail
in all circumstances against "the presumption that there is no right to appointed counsel
in the absence of at least a potential deprivation of physical liberty.""' Lassiter's slim
majority concluded that due process would require appointment of counsel only when
"the parent's interests were at their strongest, the State's interests were at their weakest,
and the risks of error were at their peak."ll 2
A year after Lassiter, the Court held in Santosky v. Kramer that due process permits
termination of parental rights only where the state establishes one or more grounds for
termination by at least clear-and-convincing evidence, a standard of proof higher than the
ordinary civil preponderance-of-the-evidence standard."' Santosky held that the clearand-convincing standard is appropriate where the individual interests at stake are "particularly important" and "more substantial than mere loss of money."" 4 Applying the
three Eldridge factors in the context of termination dispositions, the Court found the
parental interest commanding, the risk of error from using a preponderance standard
substantial, and the countervailing governmental interest favoring that standard comparatively slight.
In 1996, in M.L.B. v. S.LJ., the Supreme Court held that due process and equal
protection prohibit states from conditioning an appeal from termination orders on the
parent's ability to pay record preparation fees."' M.L.B. stressed the importance of family
life and the "unique kind of deprivation" worked by termination orders:
Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among associational
rights this Court has ranked as "of basic importance in our society," rights sheltered by the
Fourteenth Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect. . . . In contrast to matters modifiable at the parties' will or based on changed circumstances, termination adjudications involve the awesome authority of the State "to
6
destroy permanently all legal recognition of the parental relationship.""'
Additional Grounds for Termination
In a termination of parental rights proceeding, the state typically must establish (by
at least the clear-and-convincing evidence mandated by Santosky) one or more statutory
grounds for termination and that termination is in the child's best interests. Abuse and
neglect were discussed earlier in this article. This section discusses additional grounds for
termination.
109 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
110 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (citation omitted).
111 Id. at 31.

112 Id
113 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
114 Id. at 756 (citation omitted).

115 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
116 Id. at 127-28 (citation omitted).

26

|

JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JOURNAL / Winter 2010

Out-of-Home Placement
Where (as in Santosky) a child has been in foster care, the state may move to
terminate parental rights on the ground that the parents have failed to take corrective
actions necessary to allow the child to return home safely within a reasonable time. To
overcome constitutional objections, the state must show that it clearly articulated to the
parents the requirements for return of custody. In addition, the state may need to prove
that it made reasonable efforts to reunite the family by helping the parents meet the
requirements. In termination proceedings asserting this ground, the underlying basis for
the initial removal is not at issue. The dispositive issues are the time in foster care and
whether the parents and state have complied with the state's requirements.
Some states have made the passage of time alone a basis for termination. Because
delays may be no fault of the parent, terminating parental rights based solely on the
passage of time may violate the parent's substantive due process rights to the child's
custody; delays may be due to court administrative needs, waiting lists for services. such
as drug treatment programs, and other problems unrelated to the parent's fitness."

ParentalAbsence
The court may terminate parental rights when a parent abandons a child or makes
only token efforts to visit and communicate with the child while routinely failing to pay
child support. Parental absence constitutes abandonment only when the parent abandoned the child intentionally and without just cause."'
A parent's long-term incarceration may establish abandonment by leaving the
parent unable to support or maintain contact with a child. Incarceration per se may not
be a basis for termination, but imprisonment can be a factor the court considers. In Vance
v. Lincoln County Department ofPublic Welfare, for example, the Mississippi Supreme Court
upheld termination of the parental rights of a mother who had concurrent sentences of
fifty and thirty years for murder and armed robbery."' Mississippi law permitted termination of parental rights based on a "substantial erosion of the relationship between the
parent and child which was caused at least in part by the parent's . . . prolonged imprisonment."' 20 Efforts to place the child with relatives had failed.
If the incarcerated parent can afford private care or has relatives who can care for the
child, a state might have no interest in or grounds for termination. Many prison systems
permit children to visit their incarcerated parents, but children have no constitutional
right to such visitation.' 2 '

117 See, e.g., In re H.G., 757 N.E.2d 864 (Ill. 2001). But see In rejagger L., 708 N.W.2d 802 (Neb.
2006) (upholding termination on the ground that the child had been "in an out-of-home placement for
fifteen or more months of the most recent twenty-two months," in addition to other grounds).
118 See, e.g., In re Adoption of B.O., 927 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
119 582 So.2d 414 (Miss. 1991).
120 Id. at 417.
121 See Overton v. Bazzerta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003).
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Abuse of a Sibling
As mentioned earlier, some parents abuse one child-the "target child"-but do
not physically harm their other children. Under the doctrine sometimes called "anticipatory abuse," abuse of a child is probative of how the parents might treat the child's
siblings in the same circumstances. 2 2 Courts consider not only that the abuse of one child
is a high risk factor indicating a dangerous environment and a likelihood of abuse of other
children, but also that witnessing such abuse harms children who are not yet abused
themselves.12 3 In extreme cases, the court may terminate parental rights to a child based
entirely on proof of abuse of a sibling, even where no evidence is adduced concerning
injury to the child and where all evidence concerns the sibling. "When faced with a
potentially harmful situation, the juvenile court does not have to wait until harm is done
before it can act. 1 2 4
Mental Incapacity, Mental Illness or Immaturity
A parent's mental incapacity is not typically a per se basis for termination but also
does not justify a lesser level of care by the parent. Courts focus on the child and on the
parent's ability to care for the child, rather than on the parent's disability.12 , The
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) does not provide the parent a defense against
conduct that would otherwise justify termination because termination proceedings are
not "services, programs or activities" within the meaning of the Act.12 6
In In re B.S., for example, the Vermont Supreme Court found the ADA inapplicable, but held that even if it did apply, the mother had suffered no discrimination
because state law did not make mental disability, by itself, a ground for termination.127
A mentally disabled parent, the court continued, could meet the four criteria for determining the best interests of the child under the termination statute:
(1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's natural parents, foster
parents, siblings, and others who may significantly affect the child's best interests, (2) the
child's adjustment to home and community, (3) the likelihood the natural parent will be
able to resume parental duties within a reasonable period of time, and (4) whether the
natural parent has played and continues to play a constructive role in the child's welfare.128
Because the touchstone is the best interests of the child, courts have similarly held
that a parent cannot invoke his or her own adolescence to avoid a ground for termination
otherwise established. In In re McCrary, for example, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that
a maximum two-year time limit on reunification efforts did not violate the due process

122
123
124
125

See, e.g., In re Marino S., 795 N.E.2d 21 (N.Y 2003).
Id.
In re M.A.T, 934 S.W.2d 2, 4 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
See, e.g., In re D.A., 862 N.E.2d 829 (Ohio 2007).
126 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134.

127 693 A.2d 716 (Vt. 1997).
128 Id. at 720.

28

1 JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JOURNAL / Winter 2010

rights of the minor, who had given birth when she was fifteen.1 2 9 The mother urged that
because minor parents often lack the social and emotional maturity necessary to rear a
child, the limit should not begin to run until she turned eighteen and thus reached
majority. The court of appeals found it "simply unacceptable" to allow the child "at
such a developmentally critical stage of its life to languish in a state of temporary
custodianship."' 3 0

EXPEDITING TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS
ASFA requires states to initiate termination of parental rights proceedings in some
cases marked by severe parental misconduct or the passage of time. The requirement
applies
in the case of a child who has been in foster care under the responsibility of the State for
fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months, or, if a court of competent jurisdiction has
determined a child to be an abandoned infant (as defined under State law) or has made a
determination that the parent has committed murder of another child of the parent,
committed voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent, aided or abetted,
attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or such a voluntary manslaughter, or committed a felony assault that has resulted in serious bodily injury to the child or
to another child of the parent.
131
ASFA's requirements do not apply, however, where the child is being cared for by
a relative, where the state documents a compelling reason why termination would not be
in the best interests of the child, or where the state has not yet provided the family
reasonable services necessary for safe return of the child to the home.
Some state termination statutes create rebuttable presumptions that termination is
in the child's best interests for serious parental misconduct that exceeds the ASFA
requirements. Such misconduct includes causing the child to be conceived as a result of
rape, incest, lewd conduct with a child under sixteen, or sexual abuse of a child under
sixteen; murdering or intentionally killing the child's other parent or being incarcerated
32
with no possibility of parole.'

THE ROLE OF THE CHILD'S ATTORNEY
The Supreme Court has not extended the constitutional right to counsel to children
in protection proceedings, and only a few states have conferred such a right under their

129 600 N.E.2d 347 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
130 Id. at 353.

131 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
132 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 16-2005.
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state constitutions.'3 3 Virtually all states, however, have statutes requiring appointment
of a representative for the child, who may be designated an attorney for the child, a
guardian ad litem, a law guardian, or some other title. CAPTA conditions eligibility for
specified federal funding on a state's providing a guardian ad litem "in every case
involving an abused or neglected child which results in a judicial proceeding."134 CAPTA
does not require that the guardian ad litem be an attorney and has been amended to
specifically allow lay persons to be guardians ad litem.
Some states use trained lay volunteers, rather than attorneys, to represent children
in abuse and neglect cases. These volunteers are frequently called Court Appointed
Special Advocates, or CASAs. CASA volunteers are used in a variety of models of
representation; they may proceed independently, provide assistance to attorneys, or serve
in addition to attorneys, sometimes with separate counsel to advocate their position in
court.
In states that use attorneys as representatives, the role of the child's attorney is often
ambiguous. Some lawyers pay little or no attention to their child client, believing they
should advocate for what they believe is best for the child. Other attorneys believe they
should advocate for what the child client wants and, as much as possible, try to advise and
confer with the child as if he or she were an adult. Some jurisdictions expect the attorney
to fulfill both roles. Underlying this ambiguity is concern about the child client's
capacity, frequently coupled with a lack of clarity about the purpose of representation in
a particular case.
This ambiguity is not resolved by the major model professional codes, the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct and its predecessor, the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 1.14(a) of the Model Rules, for example,
provides that "when a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in
connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental
impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible,
maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client." The Rules are silent,
however, about what standard should be used to judge the client's decision-making
abilities.
Studies of representation of children in abuse and neglect cases have reported that
the quality of representation is often low. The right to counsel means the right to effective
counsel, though attorneys are often overwhelmed with their caseloads. In Kenny A. ex rel.
Winn v. Perdue, for example, one attorney testified that
she had "failed to personally meet or speak with 90 percent of [her) own clients," and that
there are cases where no one ever reviewed the medical, social service, education, or other
records for a child, met with the foster care provider, or even met with the child. She also
testified that because of her caseload, she often does not have time . . . to monitor whether

133 See, e.g., Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F.Supp.2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2005); In reJamie TT,
599 N.YS.2d 892 (App. Div. 1993).

134 42 U.S.C. § 5106a.
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her child client is in a safe foster care placement. In fact, she admitted, "I don't know where
a lot of the children I represent are. "135
In an effort to improve quality, in 1996 the ABA adopted Standards of Practice for
Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases.
Malpractice and Immunity
If the child's representative assumes a traditional attorney's role, the usual malpractice standards should apply.' 36 If the attorney assumes a guardian ad litem role,
however, the attorney may qualify for the quasi-judicial immunity that most courts have
conferred on these representatives:
A guardian ad litem serves to provide the court with independent information regarding the
placement or disposition that is in the best interests of the child. This independent
determination is crucial to the court's decision. The threat of civil liability would seriously
impair the ability of the guardian ad litem to independently investigate the facts and to
report his or her findings to the court. As a result, the ability of the judge to perform his or
her judicial duties would be impaired and the ascertainment of truth obstructed."'
Role at Trial and Confidentiality
Because of ambiguity about the attorney's role, it may be unclear whether the
child's attorney may or must testify, or whether attorney-child communications are
confidential. In some jurisdictions, the child's representative can be cross-examined if his
or her recommendations are based on an independent investigation that includes facts
that have not been made part of the evidence. If the recommendations are based on
evidence that has been presented to the court, however, cross-examination is not permitted because the recommendations are analogous to counsel's arguments on how the
evidence should be viewed."' If the representative does testify, some courts protect the
attorney-client privilege, though other courts do not. 9

CONCLUSION
The stakes remain high for judges, advocates, and other professionals intimately
involved in preventing, diagnosing, adjudicating, and treating child maltreatment:
135 356 F. Supp.2d 1353, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
136 See, e.g., Marquez v. Presbyterian Hosp., 608 N.YS.2d 1012 (Sup. Ct. 1994).
137 Ward v. San Diego County Dep't of Social Servs., 691 F.Supp. 238, 240 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
138 See, e.g., In re J.E.B., 854 P.2d 1372 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
139 Compare Nicewicz v. Nicewicz, 1995 WL 390800 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (guardian ad lirem, who
was an attorney, allowed to testify about conclusions and recommendations, but asserted the privilege
concerning confidential communications with the child) and In re Order Compelling Production of Records
of Maraziti, 559 A.2d 447 (NJ. Super. A.D. 1989) (communication between attorney and daughters of the
defendant were protected by attorney-client privilege) with In re Christina W., 639 S.E.2d 770 (W.Va. 2006)
(guardian ad litem must disclose information to a court to safeguard the best interests of the child, even when
the child client had been assured by the attorney that their communications would be kept confidential) and
Ross v. Gadwah, 554 A.2d 1284 (N.H. 1989) (privilege does not apply to guardian ad litem, even when the
guardian is an attorney).
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Maltreated children are more likely than their peers to have significant depression. They also
are more apt to engage in violent behavior, especially if they have been subjected to physical
abuse, and their social and moral judgments often are impaired. Maltreated children also
tend to lag behind their peers in acquiring new cognitive and social skills, so that their
academic achievement is chronically delayed. 40
The ill effects of child maltreatment can be long-lasting and even inter-generational.
(T)he rate of depression among adult women who report having been sexually abused as
children is quite high. Adult survivors of sexual abuse also are especially likely to report
concerns about their sexual adequacy. Similarly, aggressiveness is a remarkably persistent
personality trait in abused boys and often is part of a pattern of continuing antisocial
behavior. Although most maltreated children do not become maltreating parents, the risk
of their doing so is markedly greater than if they had not been abused themselves.' 4i
The ill effects of child maltreatment may indeed be long-lasting and even intergenerational, but so may be the positive effects of successful prevention, intervention,
treatment, and care, the goals of readers of these pages.
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141 Id.

ADVISORY BOARD ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, Supra note

13 at 5.

